Introduction
Since the first expression of the Hippocratic oath, it has been recognized that science and ethics are inextricably intertwined. Our ability to manipulate the genome of plants and animals has given rise to new ethical considerations over the past few decades in the fields of medicine and agriculture. Indeed, the development of a separate regulatory system across Europe indicates that genetically modified (GM) organisms have been consistently treated as 'special' since they were first created. More recently, the establishment of the Human Genetics Commission and the Biotechnology Commission in the UK indicate attempts by government to actively integrate ethics with other considerations in biotechnology decision making; however, perceptions and interpretations of the ethical issues raised by biotechnology differ quite radically across society.
The genetic diversity of domesticated plants has been enhanced by selective breeding and by techniques such as mutagenesis and embryo rescue; however, recombinant DNA technology allows us to move genes from animals to plants or vice versa, regardless of evolutionary history. Some see this new technique as a logical extension for plant breeders, greatly enhancing the pool of available genetic diversity and allowing the creation of crops with desirable agronomic traits that hitherto had either not been possible or would have taken over ten years of conventional breeding to establish. Others regard this as a watershed, as something fundamentally different, intervening with what might be thought of as the fabric of life, which raises ethical concerns about the process itself.
There is a view that regardless of the risks or the potential of this technology, there is something fundamentally wrong with moving genes between species. It has been proposed that this view has its roots in Platonic thinking. An empirical biologist would tend to see every individual within a population as unique, with species being an approximate grouping of individuals with similar characteristics. Species, therefore, exist on a continuum with other organisms in their evolutionary past, and through their past are connected with other species in the present. This view we owe to Darwin. Aristotle, Davies explains, had quite an opposite view of the world. His concept of species was as eternal, ideal forms, of which individuals of any one species were imperfect approximations. This was an established way of thinking for more than 2000 years, until the mid-nineteenth century. With such a philosophy, the transfer of genes between incompatible species and across kingdoms would seem unnatural and objectionable. Both of these philosophies contribute to current day thinking; for example, the classification of species is still a useful concept, as evolution moves on a much slower timescale than our everyday experience. Although we may have a range of perceptions as to the extent to which GM organisms are unnatural, it is wrong to equate natural and ethical. Few would deny that surgical intervention is ethical, and many would extend this to control of fertility and gene therapy.
It is clear, however, that not everything that can be done, should be done. Biotechnology could be regarded as a purely commercial activity, with the 'science push' providing the range of potential products, and the 'market pull' resolving which of those products will be successful. However, this reduces the ethical status of the contribution both science and society can make. Here, three contemporary issues are discussed in which ethical and socio-economic considerations might provide the filters by which society resolves which products are developed to market.
BioMedNet
May 15, 2004
Original web page at BioMedNet.
